ABSTRACT
Introduction
Since the introduction of the first co-determination laws in Germany in the fifties, their effects have been the subject of much discussion and controversy. Irrespective of this discussion, the laws have been extended, most recently as part of works constitution act in 2001 1 .
Furthermore, the European Union is thinking about introducing similar rules at a European level. Although the European regulations will have less far-reaching effects on workers' rights than the German ones, the German experience should be of interest for policy making.
The expected effects of co-determination are discussed quite intensively and with very distinct views. An important issue arising during the discussion about the effects of codetermination is technological progress. It is frequently supposed that at the very least codetermination will increase the time needed to reach decisions 2 . This may well negatively affect the introduction time of process and product innovations. Other, non-co-determined firms might react more flexibly and the larger co-determined firms would in this case lose innovative potential.
However, a direct effect of co-determination may also exist as workers might oppose the introduction of process innovations, if they fear negative effects on employment. Product innovations might also be affected, since product innovations go hand in hand with a reorganization of work and the workers will presumably dislike any new organization. On the other hand, it is frequently argued that co-determination improves information management in a firm, and improved information will most probably have a positive impact on technological progress. In our view, it remains an empirical question as to whether co-determination has a negative or positive effect on innovation.
In contrast to the intense theoretical discussion and the research on the effects of works councils, very few empirical studies exist which examine the effects of codetermination. The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of the German codetermination law of 1976 on technological progress, estimated at firm level. Our measure for technological progress is the number of patents granted to a particular company. The main difference to earlier research (Kraft and Stank 2004) is the inclusion of the theoretical model and the application of a superior econometric methodology for count data. The empirical test takes account of the panel structure of the data and uses standard errors, which are adjusted for clustering.
1 Works Constitution Act Revision of 22.6.2001. 2 Representative for this view is von Weizsäcker (1984) .
important decisions. The supervisory board meets less frequently than the board of directors, in many cases it is four times per year. During these meetings all important questions concerning business policy and company strategy are discussed.
The third co-determination law and perhaps the one with the most important effects on the economy as a whole, is the co-determination law of 1976 (MitbestG) . It applies to firms with at least 2000 employees. In such companies, the employees have the right to a 50% representation on the supervisory board. However, in contrast to the regulations in the coal and mining industry, in case of a conflict the chairman of the supervisory board, who is determined by the capital owners, has two votes. Hence in this case the expression "quasiparity" is more appropriate than speaking of parity co-determination. Another difference with respect to the coal and mining industry is that the appointment of the personal director does not require the approval of the employees.
One might ask the general question what kind of authorizations a supervisory board has and which topics are at all discussed at the meetings. The most important issue is presumably the appointment of the board of directors and of the CEO. A subcommittee of the supervisory board is also responsible for remuneration including determination of fixed and flexible components.
In general, the supervisory board must be informed about any important business decision and must approve all issues of significant relevance for the company. Usually a list of important operations which require approval is defined ("zustimmungspflichtige Geschäfte"). This list can be divided into decisions concerning the current situation and strategic decisions. The report on the present situation covers, among other things, market conditions (sales, market share), employment (number of jobs, costs, working time, productivity, turnover), production (production volume, inventories, material costs, capacity), finance (debt, equity, leverage, investment), and profitability (cash flow, profits, return on investment, liquidity).
Strategic decisions with a medium to long-term relevance encompass market development (technology, general trends in the main industry, the economy and foreign markets), medium to long-term corporate planning (strategy, research and development, human resources, production, finance, forecasts concerning sales volume and profits) 5 . Sick, Köstler and Mielke (2005, 39 ) also list internal as well as external research and development expenditures among the list of operations that need approval. The German Stock Companies Act stipulates in § 289 that the directors have to inform the members of the supervisory board 5 This enumeration follows Theisen (1996, 92) .
about general business trends. In particular, transactions which have taken place after the end of the accounting year, the expected development of the company, and research and development expenditures have to be reported. 6 Sometimes even the selling or acquisition of patents is considered as an essential operation. 7 Hence innovation policy is (among other topics) an issue that must be dealt with during the meetings of the supervisory board and the R&D policy must be approved by the members. Jürgens and Lippert (2005) argue that supervisory boards not only approve innovation projects (or reject them) in many cases, but encourage research on concrete innovations.
It might be the case that the supervisory boards have the power to discuss and decide on innovation policy, but for some reason this right may not be executed. Fischer and Beckmann (2007, 85) explicitly explore the topics on which information is provided for the members of the supervisory boards. Information concerning R&D is distributed in 31.0% of all cases on a monthly basis, in 21.2% quarterly and in 22.1% biannually. In 10.6% the members of the supervisory boards report not to have received any information and in 15.0% of all cases no answers are given. Fischer and Beckman (2007, 115) also investigate the use of the information given. Accordingly the information is in the first place of help to control the top management but is also used as a measure to control the realization of decisions of the supervisory boards. Hence codetermination may well affect innovative activity.
The effects of German co-determination laws have been discussed controversially since their introduction in the 1950s. Irrespectively of this controversy, most recently the laws have been extended on national level and also the EU aims at introducing similar rules.
Although the European regulations will have less far-reaching effects on workers' rights the German experience should be of interest.
One important topic connected with co-determination is innovativeness. Technical progress might be affected in many ways and one effect could simply be exerted by the requirement to discuss issues with the employees' representatives on the supervisory boards so that decision making takes longer. This in turn might have an impact on the time necessary to introduce product and process innovations.
Moreover workers are likely to oppose the introduction of process innovations directly, if they fear negative effects on employment. This might not only affect process innovations, but also product innovations, as these are frequently related to reorganizations of work, which are presumably disliked by workers. Thus workers' representatives on the supervisory boards could aim at stopping or at least delaying innovative projects.
6 Potthoff and Trescher (1993, 134) .
In contrast the proponents of codetermination argue that co-determination improves information processing, and improved information could positively affect technological progress 8 . Hence a priori it is unclear whether co-determination has a negative or positive effect on innovation and therefore this issue has to be analyzed empirically. However despite the political relevance and the many theoretical contributions, empirical analysis on the effects of co-determination is rare. For this reason, our contribution is an examination of the effects of the German co-determination law of 1976 on innovativeness. We use the number of patents granted to a particular company as a measure of technical progress.
It is possible that the co-determination law has no effect at all, since in the case of conflict the capital owners still have the majority of the votes. However, the practice of codetermination shows that nearly all decisions are reached unanimously and thus the board tries to reach a consensus. The employees might ask for the approval of one issue as "compensation", when the interests of the employees are affected.
In our view, there appear to be two main differences between co-determination based on the works council and the supervisory board: Firstly, the works council does not exist in many firms and the decision of the workforce to ask for it is unlikely to be accidental. This means that firms with a works council must not be representative for the whole economy, but subject to a selection process and research must take this into account. On the one hand firms with a works council might be those with particularly bad industrial relations. On the other hand they might, however, be those with a stable workforce, low turnover rates, highly qualified workers, as these workers are interested in the firm in question and take on responsibility. In contrast to the introduction of a works council the co-determination law is mandatory. There is no choice and therefore the effects of this kind of regulation is not "contaminated" by selection effects of one kind or another.
Secondly, the works council is responsible for social affairs and industrial relations and here it has some powerful rights, but the "hard" economic topics like investment and so on are still within the responsibility of top management. The works councils are informed only concerning economic developments (if the plant has 100 or more employees) but that is all. In contrast, the co-determination law requires a participation of the workers on all essential decisions at the highest level within the firm. The most important right is perhaps the appointment of the top management and the renewal or non-renewal of their contracts.
7 Gerum, E. (2007, 270 3. Theoretical Considerations
General Discussion
The theoretical discussion is quite controversial and apparently also affected by ideological positions. In the first step, one might ask whether co-determination will have any effect. As mentioned above, in the case of a conflict the capital owners still have the majority of the votes. With this in mind, why should co-determination have any effect at all?
The commission "Mitbestimmung" also discusses this point and argues that the overwhelming majority of all decisions are unanimous. The supervisory board attempts to reach decisions which are acceptable to all members. Consensus is perhaps not a bad idea if decisions have to be reached in the company, and the workforce will show improved motivation if they recognize that their interests are also being taken into account. (Final report of the Commission Co-determination Chapter 8, Nr. 2 and Nr. 5). Unanimous decisions will be accepted more easily by the employees as being fair, and equity considerations might well have their affect productivity (cf. for example in a different context Akerlof and Yellen 1990) .
However, even if the result is a cooperative one, decisions will certainly take longer if a consensus is needed; compromises will in part limit the interests of the capital owners and flexibility is necessarily reduced. It is clearly possible that such an environment reduces the innovativeness of an organization. Co-determination may well lead to a tendency to maintain the status quo in order to avoid any conflict.
Concerning mandatory co-determination, there are two schools in economics with very different opinions. According to the property rights theory, decision rights must be concentrated among those persons who bear the risk (cf. among others Furubotn 1978 , Alchian 1984 The property rights theory, in general, dislikes intervention by government into the decision rights of firms. The argument is that if it were efficient, then it would emerge in an evolutionary way by itself (see among others Jensen and Meckling 1979) . Clearly this argument is relevant, although there are situations possible, where the market mechanism does not work. Additional support for a skeptical view concerning this law might come from a political-economic perspective. The co-determination law of 1976 was passed during the SPD/FDP (social democrats and liberals) government. Traditionally, the social democrats are associated with unions and one could argue that this government introduced this law in order to do the unions a favor, even if the whole economy does not benefit from it. This has some logic, if one believes in rent-seeking. In contrast to the view of the opponents of codetermination the participation theorists are less optimistic regarding the outcome of market 9 Cf. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1984) for an investigation on this question.
processes in general. In particular they emphasize the role of market imperfections, which impede realization of a first best solution 10 . One possible problem is imperfect information concerning the work process and organization. Co-determination is by construction an institution, which fosters information exchange. The proponents of such an institutional setting argue that the implementation of this institution enables the use of information from employees, which would otherwise be lost. Furthermore, it will lead to a more cooperative solution, and the conflict between capital owners and the workers is reduced if not solved.
According to this view, productivity will increase as a result, and such firms will be successful on the market 11 .
It is also argued that codetermination serves as a control mechanism against management opportunism. Managers may well have their own interests, which must not necessarily coincide with those of the capital owners. Workers and their representatives may in many cases have better information on the behavior of the managers than the capital owners, in particular if capital shares are widely distributed. The worker representatives can exert pressure on the top management to follow the aims of the company and not their own ones. Growth might be limited to a non-risky expansion path and investment projects with uncertain returns might be cancelled.
Finegold and Soscice (1988) discuss the way how firms meet declining demand. In countries like Germany companies use internal restructuring with an emphasis on product innovation and internal training activities. The high investment in human capital along with high employment protection lead to internal flexibility with not much labor adjustment, but engagement of the workforce for the company including support for innovation. This is also realized by advices of the members of the supervisory board. Freeman and Lazear (1995) offer a number of arguments as to why the market solution may be inefficient. They state that any participation rights are connected with redistribution and that it is this redistribution process which impedes voluntary agreement. The authors start from the assumption that the organization has a rent R , which depends on the bargaining power of the workers' x. The rent first rises and then declines in x . The share τ ( ) x of the rent goes to the workers and this share also depends on x , with an increasing share if x rises.
The firm maximizes:
and this implies 10 Cf. Smith (1991) for a discussion of the arguments of the participation theorists.
Therefore there is not enough co-determination if rent maximization is the aim.
On the other hand the incentives of the workers are:
and this in turn yields:
Then we have too much co-determination if again the rent should be maximized
The commission co-determination (final report, Ch. 3 and 8) supports the view of productivity enhancing effects of co-determination (our translation):
"Despite all the difficulty of an accurate measurement, many critics of codetermination also accept the peace-keeping and productive effects of consent and cooperation, which are supported by co-determination rights, in principle."
Finally, it might be argued that capital owners are unwilling by principle to share their decision rights, simply because they like their independence. This may or may not be efficient, but that is not the reason for them to behave in this way.
Theory is unable to answer our question and it remains a task for empirical research.
Therefore, in this respect, we follow Junkes and Sadowski (1999, S.63, our translation):
"Theoretically there is (still) no generally accepted answer to the question of the economic effects of laws of co-determination. Rather, it appears necessary to look for empirically measurable effects concerning supervisory board co-determination laws in
Germany."
A Model on Co-determination and Innovation
11 In a different but related context Finegold and Soscice (1988) argue that the involvement of unions in curriculum development of training courses is one reason for the better qualification of worker in such countries like Germany and Sweden in comparison to the UK. We enlarge a model on co-determination originally developed by Kraft (1998 Kraft ( , 2001 . The main modification is the extension by considering R&D expenditures 12 . As reviewed above since the effects of co-determination are quite controversy discussed. An important issue arising during the discussion about the effects of co-determination is technological progress. It is frequently supposed that at the very least co-determination will increase the time needed to reach decisions. This may well negatively affect the introduction time of process and product innovations. Other, non-co-determined firms might react more flexibly and the larger codetermined firms would in this case lose innovative potential.
Only very few empirical studies exist which examine the effects of co-determination.
The purpose of this paper therefore is to study the effects of the German co-determination law of 1976 on technological progress, using firm level data. To measure technological progress we use the number of patents granted to a particular company. However, in contrast to earlier research (see, e.g., Kraft and Stank 2004 ) both a theoretical model as well as a superior econometric methodology for count data is applied.
In contrast to Kraft (2001) we are only able to solve the model for rather simple situations: we assume a duopoly with symmetric bargaining power and the firms either bargain or maximize profits without co-determination, but we do not consider asymmetric solutions with one bargainer and one profit-maximizer. However, we include product differentiation, which was omitted in the earlier studies.
Bargaining on Employment in Contrast to Profit Maximization
The purpose of this section is a simple comparison between bargaining over employment and profit maximization with respect to the incentives to perform R&D. The starting point of the theoretical analysis is the assumption that wages are determined by an exogenous process at industry level, which is consistent with the German institutional setting. Exogenous means not 12 Cf. for an alternative approach to model the effect of codetermination on R&D Granero (2006) . His model is influenced at the individual firm level, as is the case if wages are negotiated at the economywide level.
In our model decisions are reached by negotiations between the employees and the firm owner. We are only able to solve the model for symmetric bargaining power. Hence, this is a difference to Kraft (1998 Kraft ( , 2001 . Employment is determined at the level of the individual firm. The bargaining solution will be compared to the situation where employment is fixed by the employer alone.
Bargaining takes place between the firm owner(s) and representatives of the employees. This might be the union or any other representative body. Industry unions, on the other hand, are not considered. This scenario is consistent, for example, with German co-determination, where representatives of the firm's employees decide. In most cases, these are members of the German unions, but this is no precondition for such a task.
We assume a duopoly situation with Cournot-Nash optimization. As Booth (1995, 95) observes: "It appears to be an empirical regularity that imperfections in the labor market are correlated with imperfections in the product market". Unions will only be able to negotiate employment (or wage) increases above the competitive level if there is some rent or surplus to be distributed. Thus it does not appear to be a purely academic exercise to investigate bargaining power by unions (or other workers' representatives institutions) within the context of oligopoly. The two firms 1 and 2 produce similar products. Demand is determined according to a negatively sloped inverse demand curve of this particular shape:
Of course P stands for the price and q i (q j ) is output by firm 1 (firm 2). The slope of the demand curve is determined by the parameter b and in contrast to earlier work we include here product differentiation by the term 0 1 θ ≤ ≤ . If 0 θ = we have two monopolies and with 1 θ = the products are homogenous.
We start with bargaining, assuming the bargaining process to be represented by the well-known Nash-bargaining solution. As shown by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) , the simple Nash solution may still be used as the equilibrium outcome of a sequence of non-cooperative moves. Thus this specification is more general than it initially appears.
The union has utility Z(w,L) which depends positively on both, employment L and wages. Specifically following e.g. McDonald and Solow (1981) or Dowrick (1990) , we set:
based on the assumption that codetermination has a direct effect on the objective function of the firm.
Z(w,L) = LU(w),
where U is a differentiable utility function. Given that the wage is determined elsewhere, only employment remains to be maximized. γ θ > + and we assume that this condition is satisfied.
As said before, usually this specification is applied to process innovation, but in our case an alternative interpretation as product innovation seems to be more useful 13 . In this case we interpret R&D expenditures as measures to improve the quality of a particular good. Now x shifts the demand curve to the right and we specify this situation as an increase of d. The
which is exactly the same as above 14 .
In order to proceed, a concrete and extremely simple production function is applied: q=L (cf. for a similar assumption Dowrick 1989 and Bughin 1995 . Now the bargaining as well as the profit maximization process is easily described. We use the Nash-bargaining solution. Bargaining is represented by the following product in the case of symmetric bargaining power: 13 We apply a very specific production function as only labor is considered. In order to interprete x as R&D expenditures that reduce production costs, we offer the following interpretation: Aside of labor a second input is needed, which is however normalized to one unit per worker. Part of the other input however depreciates. Depreciation is now endogenously determined. If more expenditures for R&D take place, the "other" input can be used for more time periods and less depreciation costs arise. Therefore with higher x production costs are lower.
14 In principle, we do not need c, and all results are similar, if c is omitted.
(2) ( )
The threat points have been set to zero for both parties following a popular simplification found, among others, in Fershtman (1985) , Bughin (1995) or Booth and Chatterji (1995) . This seems to be defensible for the employer, as no capital and thus sunk costs are considered. On the other hand it implies that other employment opportunities outside of this particular industry are disregarded.
It is only bargained on employment, not on x. The model becomes trivial there if it is also bargaining about R&D, as the employees always have an incentive to increase x, as output then rises. After taking the logarithm this equation is maximized with respect to q i , which leads to the reaction function:
Symmetric Bargaining or Profit-Maximizing Firms
As mentioned above, we are only able to solve the model for symmetric bargaining or symmetric profit maximization. The asymmetric solutions with one firm bargaining and one firm maximizing profits are too complicated for an explicit solution with two endogenous variables q and x.
If both firms are bargainers and behave according to Cournot-Nash they end up with the following output level:
The firms choose optimal employment (output) as well as optimal x simultaneously. It is then 
Comparison of R&D Expenditures, Output Levels and Profits
In a further step we want to compare profits, R&D expenditures and output levels of bargainers and profit maximizers. The comparison is somewhat easier if the ratio is considered instead of the difference. Dividing equations (5) and (9) and in a second step (4) and (8) For values of γ larger than 0.5 the bargainers' innovative activity and output is always larger than that of the profit maximizers. We find this is a surprising result.
The comparison between the different profits is slightly more complicated. From equations (6) and (10) we get: Hence it is quite likely that the bargaining firm has higher expenditures for R&D even if R&D is not the subject of negotiations. The reason for this is that the bargaining firm has an incentive for firm size, as long as this is connected with employment. Both process and product innovation have a positive impact on size and this determines the result.
Empirical Study

Earlier Research
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no empirical study concerning the effects of codetermination on innovativeness. However, there are three kinds of related research: 1)
Studies on the effects of works councils in Germany, 2) studies on the impact of unions on innovative activity for the US and Great Britain and 3) research on the impact of codetermination on productivity and profitability of German firms.
As explained earlier, works councils are not mandatory and therefore one way to estimate the effect of a works council is the comparison of firms with and without one. The first study on works councils and innovation is by FitzRoy and Kraft (1990) . They use a small sample of German firms, interact the existence of a works council with the rate of unionization and find a negative impact of this variable for innovation. Addison, Schnabel and Wagner conduct a number of empirical studies on innovation. Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2001) is a recent summary of their research results and they find no significant effect of the existence of works councils on innovation.
Many theoretical studies on unions point to a negative impact of unionization because unions raise wages and this is financed by appropriating the quasi-rents earned on capital 15 .
This acts like a tax and will therefore increase the costs of reduced investments. This is a problem particularly for intangible investments like R&D and a classical "hold-up" problem arises. A difference between the effect of a union and co-determination might be that in Germany wages are determined elsewhere but not by the supervisory board. Wage councils may have an effect on wages but the supervisory board does not discuss remuneration (with the notable exception of the salaries of the directors).
There are many studies from the US which usually report a negative impact of unionization on innovation. Examples (among others) are Conolly, Hirsch and Hirschey The first study on co-determination witch uses firm data is carried out by FitzRoy and and found a negative impact on productivity for a small sample and only one year before and one after introduction of the co-determination law. FitzRoy and Kraft (2004) show that in a panel of (West) German firms, the change from one third parity to full parity of labor representation on the supervisory board (after the Co-determination Act of 1976) resulted in a small but statistically significant increase in total factor productivity. On the other hand, Schmid (2000, 2004) find a negative effect of parity co-determination 15 A well-known example for this view is Grout (1984) .
on equity returns and other profit measures in cross sections of German firms before and after unification.
Basics of Our Empirical Study
Our empirical study concentrates on the effect of co-determination on technical progress. The basis of our study is a sample of 148 German stock companies, of which 61 are codetermined.
The criterion for selection of the other firms is simply the availability of the necessary data from companies that publish this information for the years in question. We include all information that is available to us. Our variable indicating innovativeness is the number of patents. Clearly alternative measures, such as R&D employment (see e.g. Scherer, 1965) R&D expenditures (see e.g., Grabowski and Mueller, 1978; Ben-Zion, 1984; Griliches, 1986) , the numbers of commercialized inventions (see Blundell et al., 1999, Acs and Audretsch, 1993) would also be very useful in order to test the robustness of our results. However, since German stock companies are not required to publish information on R&D our analysis is restricted to patents.
Patents as an Indicator for Innovative Activity
At least in highly industrialized countries, technological innovation is seen as a key input for long term employment and growth 16 (along with human capital investment) and therefore the understanding of the economic process that leads to process and product innovation is of great interest. However, the identification of innovative output is not easily done, as there is not a single undisputed variable which measures innovation success completely. R&D is clearly an input to the innovation production, but it may also be wasted if nothing gets invented. It is possible that co-determination does not lead to less R&D expenditures, but that these activities are not connected with a proportional research output because other, smaller and not co-determined firms are faster and get their patents granted. Sales volume realized by newly developed products is only an indicator for product and not process innovation and need not necessarily reflect innovative output, as newly developed products may be the result of spillover effects or imitation.
Patents are a very frequently used indicator for invention output, but the use of this variable has been criticised by several authors (e.g. Hall 1986, Griliches 1990 Despite its shortcomings, patent data is the most frequently used innovation output indicator, e.g. applied for comparing the innovative success of countries. One reason for its popularity is the easy access, as patent applications are systematically recorded by national patent offices. However, it should not be overlooked that most of the crucial inventions of the last century were indeed patented.
At least since the mid-1960s the relationship between firms' R&D expenditures and patent applications has been analysed (see,for example, Scherer, 1965; Mueller, 1966 and Schmookler, 1966) . Most studies typically find a strong positive relationship between patenting and R&D activity. Pakes and Griliches (1980) , for example, found a statistically significant relationship between the R&D expenditures of a firm and the number of patents received at the cross-sectional level, across firms and industries. This result was also confirmed by Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1984) by using a newly developed fixed effects estimator for count data such as patent counts. Hall, Griliches and Hausman (1984) To summarize, patents have their shortcomings as indicators of innovative success; however, this is of course also true for other measures of innovative activity, as no perfect variable exists. Furthermore, most empirical studies found a strong relation between R&D and patents.
We therefore regard the number of patents as a good proxy for innovation. One may also argue that the use of an outcome variable of the innovation production process (such as patents) is superior to an input variable (such as R&D) where the impact of co-determination is analysed. This is because codetermined firms are likely to do a lot of research, which may not necessarily be efficient. Our number of patents includes both national and European patents, which were introduced in 1978.
We compare the years before the introduction of the co-determination law [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] with the periods 1981-1990 after the law became effective. In both time periods the large and after 1976 co-determined firms are compared with smaller ones. As co-determination is inevitably connected with firm size we want to identify the impact of it by comparing the relative performance of co-determined firms in relation to other firms.
Aside of co-determination a number of control variables are used. Clearly firm size has to be taken into account. We use the number of employees and the number of employees squared. A description of the variables and relevant statistical data are shown in tables one and two. Table 2 shows the mean values and the standard deviations for our sample. It becomes obvious that patents have a high standard deviation. This is an indicator that we have a high dispersion and this has consequences for the research methodology to be discussed below.
Clearly there are industries with very low innovation and others like for example chemistry or automobiles which have a very high number of patents. 18 As one can see from figures 1 -3 in the appendix, not surprisingly, patents also strongly vary over industries as well as over time and federal states. The average number of employees in our sample is 8312, which implies co-determination for a large number of firms. Our largest firm has 280.000 employees, while we also have small firms with less than 500 workers.
17 Recent studies analyzing the relationship between R&R expenditures and patenting include Baudry and Dumont (2006) and Kim and Marschke (2004) . 18 The strongly differing values of the capital intensities also underline this fact. We have a specific size problem. Co-determination is connected to firm size and although we use size and size squared, there might be a size advantage or disadvantage, which is relevant for firms with about 2000 employees. Such an effect can be differentiated from the codetermination impact if -as we do -a before and after comparison is undertaken. The dummyvariable COD80 has unit value in the case of firms, which are co-determined in the eighties.
In addition the variable COD assumes unit values for the same firms but not only for the observations from the eighties but also for the observation from the seventies, before codetermination became effective. This variable is expected to catch possible size effects. Thus the coefficient of COD80 is expected to estimate the "pure" impact of co-determination aside of any size (dis-)advantage.
The co-determination law had to be implemented until 1978. We use data from 1981 onwards as the time period of restructuring might take longer and as patents measure the innovativeness only with some lag, since they are the outcome of an R&D process. Codetermination will (if at all) at first influence the research process and this in turn will affect the innovative output after some time. Because of this possible delay we use data until 1990.
We use information about 148 firms from the manufacturing sector. 61 of them are co- firms, the sum of the coefficients β 7 and β 8 is relevant. This is a difference in differences estimator (Wooldridge 2002, 130 ).
As exposed in section 2, before 1976 the firms with more than 500 employees had a one third co-determination right. Hence after 1976 for these firms it is a move from a one-third codetermination to quasi-parity co-determination. An additional problem is it, that after 1976 the "medium-sized" firms with 500 employees or more, but less than 2000 have still the one third co-determination, and might differ from the small ones without any codetermination.
Although one third co-determination is much less controversially discussed, there might still be an effect. In order to test for such a possibility, we estimated count data models with three groups of firms. The results are presented in an appendix.
The other variables are standard in studies on innovative activity. Employment and employment squared are used to check for size effects. In many studies it is estimated that innovative activity rises with size, but at a decreasing rate and above a certain size level the 19 The count data model necessary for estimating such an equation is explained below.
innovativeness is reduced 20 (Kamien, Schwarz, 1982) . Acs and Audretsch (1988) show that the innovative output of small and medium-sized firms in comparison to the large ones may depend on the particular industry.
Concentration ratios are also found in many investigations. It is a long discussion that concerns the impact of market concentration, with controversial opinions and also very controversial results. We do not intend to participate in this discussion but just use CONC6 as a control variable. Our concentration variable is the market share of the six largest producers, measured on the four digit level. The variable is computed by the German monopoly commission by use of data from the German statistical office. Involvement in international trade is related to this variable. Export and import ratios are use to take account of the firm's engagement in international competition.
Mansfield, Romeo and Wagner (1979) examine large-scale American enterprises and
show that with a rise of exports the innovation efforts also raise. Hirschey and Caves (1981) also conclude that international expansion and innovation activity are positively related. Bertschek (1995) explicitly examines what kind of influence is exerted by import ratios.
Using a large sample of 1270 German enterprises from the manufacturing industry, she finds that imports have a positive effect on innovativeness. The variable firm age is included, as many firms are established to market an innovation and over time the innovativeness will perhaps be reduced. finds support for this hypothesis. As a share of our firms is very old, we do not use the absolute value but, as a simple method to take account of nonlinearities, the inverse of firm age is included.
Capital intensity is used, as this variable may express the technological opportunity of the firm. With high capital intensity, it is probable that technology plays a major role. If capital is sunk to a degree, this variable may also stand for barriers to entry 21 . Earlier studies show that capital intensity has a positive impact on innovativeness [cf. Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) or Zimmermann and Schwalbach (1991) ]. Finally, industry dummies are included, as clearly the potential for innovation is very different depending on the industry and one must take this into account.
Econometric Methodology
Patent data are a classic example for count data. In this case the dependent variable assumes different discrete values including the value zero. The analysis is usually based on count data models. A popular approach is the Poisson model, which applies the Poisson distribution for the data generating process. This model is relatively easy to implement. The disadvantage is the assumption that the conditional expected value is equal to the variance. In many cases this assumption is violated, as over-dispersion occurs.
Much less frequently the opposite case of under-dispersion arises, i.e. the situation that the conditional variance is smaller than the conditional expectancy value. In the case of over- which is equal to the variance and is therefore easy to implement. In our case, the Cameron and Trivedi (1990) test clearly points to the relevance of the negative binomial model.
Count data models are based on the assumption that the exogenous variables describe the move from 0 to 1 in much the same way as, for example, from 186 to 187. However many firms do no research at all and therefore they will never have a patent. Hence, in many cases there is a fundamental difference between observations with the value zero and those which have one or more patents.
For this reason, the so-called zero-inflated models have been developed. These are enlargements of the basic Poisson or Negative Binomial models. In the first step, it is analyzed whether the dependent variable is zero or larger than zero. Any observation larger than zero is adjusted to one, and then either a Logit or a Probit model is applied. In the second step, the Poisson or Negative Binomial model is applied for those observations, where the dependent variable is one or larger.
In contrast to the original zero-inflated poisson (ZIP) model we follow Mullahey (1986) and make a further generalization. Because of the tendency of over-dispersion we do not use the Poisson model, but the more general negative binominal distribution, which permits over dispersion. The Vuong statistic tests for the appropriability of the zero-inflated models instead of standard count data models. 22 The test developed by Vuong (1989) was applied for the first time by Greene (1994) Moulton (1986 Moulton ( , 1990 has demonstrated how large this bias from clustering can be and has proposed a method to correct the standard errors. We take account of this by presenting in the tables both the standard (heteroscedasticity-consistent) and the clustering-corrected (and heteroscedasticity-consistent)
t-values.
In the first step of the empirical part of the analysis, the NegBin and the ZINB estimators are estimated using pooled data. As one can recognize from Table 3 , the results depend on the econometric model. The negative binomial model leads to an significant coefficient of COD80. However, with the zero-inflated model this variable becomes insignificant at usual levels when dropping the dummies. The Vuong statistic points to the superiority of the ZINB model, so that we conclude at this stage of the analysis that co-determination has at least not reduced the innovative activity of German firms.
Econometric Panel Models
Every panel study must take account of the relevance of fixed effects, although this is not a trivial task in the case of count data. As it is well known, firms may have permanent differences with respect to innovative activity. Some are active research companies, while others have no particular ambition to be the innovative leaders. Therefore, firm-specific effects are quite likely in the given context and they must be analysed somehow.
Fixed effects models for count data models like that developed by Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) cannot be applied in our case, as the co-determination status does not change for any firm. This implies that the individual effect cannot be differentiated from the effect of the co-determination variable.
A solution to this problem is the approach developed by Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999) . In their model, the values from a pre-sample period on patents are used to identify the individual effect. This is a very useful suggestion in our case, as information from a pre-sample period is available. Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999) propose a new method for considering firm-specific effects. They argue that the fixed effect is expressed as the stock of past innovations. Hence, if the stock of past innovation is used in the estimations, the individual effects are analyzed. They suggest using the pre-sample mean of innovations for every firm. They compare this estimation procedure with alternative methods proposed by Chamberlain (1992) and Wooldridge (1997) which are based on quasi-differenced methods of moments. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, they conclude that their method produces lower mean square errors than quasi-differencing.
Using for simplicity the standard Poisson model for count data 23 , the conditional mean of the number of patents (P) can be written as: (14) β η
where it x is the vector of observable explanatory variables and β stands for the coefficient vector. The term i η represents an unobservable individual firm specific effect, which reflects permanent differences in innovative activity. Adding an error term it ν , which is assumed to have zero mean and finite variance leads to
If the pre-sample size is assumed to be
, averages of the variables in equation (14) (including the stochastic component) over the pre-sample period are:
The probability is (taking logs): Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999) show that for a multivariate normal distribution of The marginal effect of the most important variable Cod80 is 0.76 (NegBin) and 1.24 (ZINB).
These estimates have to be compared with the mean values of the number of patents. In the case of NegBin the mean value is 10.86 and for the ZINB the respective value is 20.07 as here only the firms with one or more patents are used during the second step of the estimation and the marginal effect refers to this part of ZINB. The marginal effects are 6.99% respectively 6.17% of the mean values and therefore the marginal effect is of moderate magnitude and seems to be realistic.
In our view this is important empirical evidence against the popular opinion that codetermination impedes innovation. If innovation really leads to delayed decision making there must be offsetting counter effects. These be could information advantages, control of the behaviour of opportunistic managers or effects described by our theoretical model. The codetermined firm has a stronger incentive towards growth than a comparable company without such a bargaining system. Growth is among other factors determined by innovative activity and our empirical evidence is in accordance with this explanation.
Summing up, we find strong evidence for a positive impact of co-determination on innovation. The results are relatively robust against different specifications and also the marginal effects seem to be reasonable.
Conclusion
This paper discusses and estimates the effects of co-determination on innovative activity. The theory leads to ambiguous hypotheses concerning the impact of co-determination. We present a simple model applying Nash-bargaining on employment determination and R&D. Codetermined firms are compared with standard profit-maximizing companies and it turns out that in our model the co-determined firm will carry out more R&D.
In the second part, we present the results of an empirical study. The sample consists of 148 firms over the periods 1971-1976 and 1981-1990 . Innovation is measured by the number of patents. We use the negative Binomial and the Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial models for estimation and combine these models with the Blundell, Griffith and van Reenen (1999) approach to include fixed effects.
Our results point to the conclusion that co-determination has no negative impact on innovativeness. If at all, rather a positive effect can be estimated. Hence we cannot support the frequently heard presumption that co-determination will reduce flexibility and by this the innovative potential of companies. The marginal effects show that co-determination has no large impact. The additional consideration of one third co-determination has no effect on the main results. There are several possible explanations for this result. Co-determination may affect worker motivation and enhance information exchange. Information is an important input regarding the success of innovation projects. Moreover management might be prevented from opportunistic behavior, which would be neither in the interest of capital owners nor in that of the employees. Finally our theoretical model points to the impact of bargaining for growth incentives. Innovation clearly affects growth possibilities and therefore the higher innovative activity might be a result of modified incentives.
This study presents empirical results concerning very controversially discussed hypotheses. Apparently, worker's representatives do not generally oppose technical progress.
Most likely they regard long-term investment into knowledge capital as an opportunity to secure jobs. Hence the property rights' view that employees are more shortsightened in their actions than capital owners is not supported by the results of this study.However, there is still a lot to be done. Perhaps other studies can check the robustness of our results by using other measures for innovativeness like e.g. R&D expenditures.
Appendix: Estimations with one-third Codetermination
The effect of one third co-determination is estimated in two different ways: On the one hand a variable 1/3 Codetermination is specified, which has unit value, if a firm has actually this kind of worker participation. This means before 1977 a firm with 500 employees or more has 1/3
Co-determination and after 1976 an observation is in this category, if it has between 500 and 1999 employees. On the other hand the variable COD500-2000 has unit value, if a firm has 500 or more but below 2000 employees irrespective of the time period. Both variables are highly correlated and cannot be used simultaneously. The reader will perhaps prefer the variable 1/3 Codetermination, but this variable does not control for size effects and it is not a difference in differences estimator, as the firms are not the same before and after 1976.
The results are presented in table 6. It turns out, that the additional consideration of one third co-determination has no impact on our main results: Both variables standing for one third co-determination are significant. Also quasi-parity co-determination is still positively significant. 15 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
